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Regulation vs. the Market:




The Consumer Product Safety Commission's bicycle standard is
twenty pages long and took over five years to promulgate. It imposes
significant compliance costs on both manufacturers and consumers. For
example, it establishes frame and component stress tests, braking
system tests, mandates the use of special reflectors, and generally
prohibits numerous types of equipment and designs that are deemed
unsafe.45
The standard had its origin in the President's Commission on
Product Safety. The Commission condemned children's high-rise
bicycles in its FINAL REPORT. The Report noted that accessories then
available such as steering wheels instead of handlebars, large protruding
gear shifters, banana seats, and "wheelie" wheels, promoted injuries
and unsafe practices such as riding double and performing "wheelies."
It further announced that high-rise models accounted for 45% of all
bicycles but were associated with 57% of all injuries. It condemned the
industry for not developing product standards including ones for lights
and reflectors.46
The first part of this article begins, supra, at 77.
45 Most of this regulation became effective on May 11, 1976. Four subsections
became effective on November 13, 1976. On June 1, 1977, a federal court remanded
four provisions for reconsideration, and those four provisions were subsequently
deleted. 16 C.F.R. § 1512 (1985).
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At this time the Bicycle Manufacturers Association did develop a
safety standard which was issued in 1970. The government first
proposed a bicycle safety standard for bicycles used by those under
sixteen years old on May 10, 1973. This proposal was made under the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act by the Food and Drug
Administration. 47 This proposal did not include a proposed effective
date. It listed the problems it sought to address:4 8
[a] study of the product causation data identified the
following areas of product deficiency: (1) The rider's foot
slipping off of the pedal, (2) brake failure, (3) a component
failure, and (4) poor night visibility. Secondary injury
causes relating to protruding hardware, sharp edges, and
sharp points are also shown to be a factor'in the accident
picture.
The proposed rule was much broader in scope than this relatively
modest appearing list of possible product hazards and was based
primarily on the industry standard. The proposed rule covered all
bicycles intended for use by children of less than sixteen years of age
and established design or performance standards for nearly every
bicycle component. Yet the twenty page staff report by the FDA's
Bureau of Product Safety that purportedly served as a basis for the rule
only identified foot slippage off the pedal and failure of the brakes,
pedals and gearing as causes of accidents. 4 9 Moreover, the report
identified unsafe riding techniques which would not be affected by the
proposed regulation (e.g., riding double, jumping curbs, stunting,
excessive speed and "wheelies") as a substantial cause of children's
bicycle accidents.
46 PRESIDENrS COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 3, at 18-20.
47 Bicycles, Proposed Classification as Banned Hazardous Substance, 38 Fed. Reg.
12,300 (1973) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 191.9a and 191c.).
48 Id.
49 BuREAu OF PRODUCT SAFETY, STAFF ANALYSIS OF BICYCLE ACCIDENTS AND
INJURiEs (1972).
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Four days after the rule was first proposed, functions under the
Federal Hazardous Substances Act were transferred to the newly-created
CPSC. The Commission published its "final" regulations in 1974,
revised them in 1975 and published them again in November, 1975 with
effective dates in 1976.50
Two individual consumers and one group of consumers challenged
the legality of the promulgation itself and sixteen of the standard's
provisions. On June 1, 1977, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld the promulgation and most of the challenged
provisions. 5 1 It upheld the CPSC's authority to issue standards
covering nearly all bicycles under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
which only applied to articles intended for use by children. The court
also upheld the Commission's notice of rule making and its authority to
issue design as well as performance standards. With four exceptions,
the court upheld the Commission's support for specific provisions
stating that it was not required to develop a precise "body count."52
The court only remanded a broad prohibition of "protrusions,"
handlebar width restrictions, a brake system heat test which only applied
to hand brakes, not to foot brakes, and a provision on pedal threads for
which the court did not understand the Commission's justification. The
Commission later republished its regulation with these four provisions
deleted.53
50 See Bicycles, Establishment of Safety Standard and Proposed Labeling
Requirements, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,100 (1974); Bicycle Banning and Safety Regulations,
40 Fed. Reg. 25,480 (1975); and 40 Fed. Reg. 52,815 (1975), respectively (all to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 1512 and 1500.18 (a) (12)).
51 Forester v. C.P.S.C., 559 F.2d 774 (D. C. Cir. 1977). The other parties who
had filed for appeal of the CPSC's initial promulgation voluntarily dismissed their
suits; 559 F.2d at 781.
52 Id. at 788.
53 Bicycles Revised Safety Standards, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,034 (1978) (to be codified at
16 C.F.R. § 1512).
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The Market Approach
The development and marketing of the hardshell bicycle safety
helmet has largely been a market phenomena. The National Commission
on Product Safety found that 14% of bicycling injures are head
injuries. 54 Although this report led directly to the establishment of the
CPSC, the CPSC's standard does not require new bicycles to be sold
with a warning on head injuries or a recommendation to wear a
hardshell helmet when riding. The CPSC does encourage helmet use in
some of its safety literature.5 5 More recently, as discussed below, a
number of cities have experimented with programs to encourage helmet
use particularly by children. However, no jurisdiction other than Puerto
Rico and recently Howard County, Maryland, has required bicyclists to
wear helmets. 56 A new California law does require infants being
carried on a bicycle to wear helmets. 57
The first hardshell helmets specifically designed for bicycle use
54 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 3, at 18-20. Selbst
et al. found head and neck trauma to be the primary injury in 31% of bicycling
injured children treated by The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia in the summer of
1983. Selbst et al., Bicycle-Related Injuries, 141 AM. J. DISEASES CEILDREN 140,
141 (1987). Similarly, 67% of those hospitalized in Calgary, Canada with bicycling
related injuries had head injuries. Guichon & Myles, supra note 40.
55 The CPSC's publication directed at child bicyclists, SPROCKETMAN COMICS,
does mention the importance of wearing a helmet on page 25, but the title character
does not even have one integrated into his superhero costume.
56 See P. HILL, supra note 33, at 11 and 10 Pro Bike News 1 (Jul. 1990),
respectively.
57 CAL. VEH. CODE § 21204 (West 1987). Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey and
New York legislatures reportedly are considering similar bills. The New York
Assembly also is considering a mandatory helmet use law for all bicyclists. 9 Pro
Bike News 1, 2 (May 1989).
A recent study of 54 NEISS reported injuries to children riding in bicycle
mounted child seats found that 65% of all reported injuries were to the head and face.
27% of the head injuries were serious. The study recommended that children in such
carriers wear helmets. Sargent et al., Bicycle-Mounted Child Seats, 142 AM. J.
DISEASES CHILDHOOD 765 (1988).
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appeared in 1975. By 1979, articles in bicycling publications were
comparing helmets and encouraging their use.58 Also in that year, the
American Standards Institute drafted its first proposed bicycle helmet
performance standard. A final standard was adopted by this organization
in 1983 and the Snell Memorial Foundation recently adopted a
somewhat more demanding standard.59 A recent review of helmets in
Bicycling magazine covered 45 models from 20 manufacturers of the
"dozens" of adult helmets available.60
There have been no comprehensive national estimates or surveys of
helmet use. The National Adolescent Student Health Survey did perform
a national survey of over 11,000 eighth and tenth grade students. It
found that 87% of them rode bicycles, but 92% of them never wore a
helmet and less than 2% usually or always wore a helmet.6 1
In addition to this one national survey of two age groups, there have
been surveys or observational helmet counts performed in a number of
communities. For example, an on-the-street survey in Missoula,
Montana counted 15% of observed bicyclists wearing helmets. 6 2
Similarly, helmet counts performed in October 1984 and May 1987 in
Palo Alto, California showed that, for people below about seventeen
years old, usage increased from 10.5% to 15%. Those eighteen and
older showed an increase from 21% to 34%.63 A helmet count
58 See, e.g., Rodale, Helmet Progress, 20 Bicycling 72 (Jan. 1979) and Swart,
Helmet User's Test, 20 Bicycling 61 (Jun. 1979).
59 For a detailed discussion of helmet performance standards and performance
testing, see Minton, A Head of the Game, 1 Bicycle Rider 110 (1985) and the
follow-up article, Howels, Helmet Testing - Can We Live With These Standards?
2 Bicycle Rider 50 (1986).
60 Martin, Crash Course, 29 Bicycling 72 (Jun. 1988).
61 NATONAL ADOLESCENT STUDENT HEALTH SURVEY, INJURY PREVENTION
FACrSHEET (1988).
62 5 Bike Forum 24 (Spr. 1987).
63 8 Pro Bike News 3 (Jun. 1988).
2 RiSK'-Issues in Health & Safety 93 [Spring 19911
performed at eleven sites state-wide in the summer of 1986 found that
23% of observed bicyclists in Oregon wear helmets. 64 This study also
suggested significant variations in helmet usage among different types
of bicyclists. It found that 71% of bicyclists observed to be tourists
wore helmets compared to 36% of those observed to be commuters and
only 12% of recreational bicyclists. 65 Sadly, children in the Oregon
Study and another study conducted in Tucson, Arizona have the lowest
rate of helmet usage.6 6 The Tucson study observed 468 bicyclists.
Two elementary school children, no junior high school students, two
high school students and fifteen college students wore helmets. The
usage rates were 1.85%, 0%, 1.86% and 10%, respectively. 67
Moreover, it is not necessarily true that all bicyclists who own
helmets use them all the time, or at all. A Madison, Wisconsin survey of
bicyclists found that 19% own helmets but only 12% usually wear them
when they ride.6 8 Interviews of 516 bicyclists by Dr. Wasserman of
the University of Vermont found that only 7.8% were actually wearing a
helmet although 18.8% said they owned one.69
64 7 Pro Bike News 3 (Mar. 1987).
65 Id.
66 The Oregon study found that 6% of child recreational bicyclists, 29% of child
commuter bicyclists and 69% of child touring bicyclists wore helmets. The
comparable figures for adults were 17%, 39%, and 72%, respectively. Unpublished
charts from the OREGON DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HIGHWAY DIIoN, Dick
Unrein, Bicycle Program Manager.
67 Weiss, Bicycle Helmet Use by Children, 77 PEDATRICS 677 (1986). In contrast
to their low usage rate, 65% of more than 135,000 children under the age of 17 who
were surveyed by Cheerios, favored making bicycle helmet use mandatory for their
age group. 30 Bicycling 34 (Jun. 1989).
68 12 BikeReport 4 (Oct/Nov. 1986) and Williams, Promoting Helmets in
Madison, 17 Bicycle Forum 12, 14 (Fall 1987).
69 Wasserman et al., Bicyclists, Helmets and Head Injuries: A Rider-Based Study
of Helmet Use and Effectiveness, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1220 (1988) (Of 21
bicyclists who reported falling and striking their heads, the 8 helmeted riders reported
no head injury whereas 7 of the 13 unhelmeted riders reported such injuries).
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Information on helmet usage also has been obtained from studies of
accident victims. In August 1986, the CPSC collected data on helmet
use from bicyclists treated for injuries in hospital emergency rooms. It
found that during that month only 4% of those bicyclists treated wore
helmets. 70 A similar survey conducted in King County, Washington in
1986 found that 25% of the accident victims wore helmets.7 1 Of the
520 children treated for bicycling related injuries in the Emergency
Department of The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia in the summer of
1983 only 3 (.6%) wore protective equipment although 8% said they
owned such equipment.7 2 Of 226 injured bicyclists in Boulder,
Colorado who completed a questionaire, only 33 (15%) wore hardshell
helmets at the time of their accident.73 Surveys of North Carolina
emergency rooms revealed that 14 of 242 (5.8%) injured bicyclists
treated in 1985 and only 3 of 395 (.8%) of those treated in 1986 wore
helmets at the time of their accident. 74
Bell Helmets, a leading manufacturer of bicycle helmets, made its
one millionth bicycle helmet in 1985 and estimates that between 800,000
and one million bicycle helmets are being sold each year.75 Based on
these figures, and estimates from the Bicycle Marketing Research
Institute and other helmet manufacturers, I estimate that 8.7 million
helmets have been sold in the U.S. through the end of 1988. Although
70 Private conversation with Debbie Kensworth of the CPSC, on Feb. 16, 1988,
concerning CPSC's in-depth study of bicycle accidents, published in August, 1986.
71 Survey reported in Wilson, Bicyclists in Washington State: A Population at
Risk 13 (Unpublished paper available from the Bicycle Helmet Safety Institute,
Arlington, VA, March, 1987).
72 Selbst et al., supra note 54.
73 Watts et al., Survey of Bicycling Accidents in Boulder, Colorado, 14
PHYsiCrAN SPoRTS MED. 99, 100 (1986).
74 STuTrs, ET AL., supra note 25, at 14.
75 Letter from Mark E. Williams, Vice President/General Manager Bicycle
Division, Bell Helmets, Inc. to the author, concerning bicycle helmet sales (Apr. 8,
1986).
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these helmets are designed for only one crash, nearly all of them may
still be in use. Thus, almost 9% of the estimated 85 million bicyclists in
this country own hardshell helmets. As the above studies indicate,
helmet usage appears concentrated among regular adult bicyclists, with
children in most communities seldom using helmets.
Estimating Safety Effects
In order to properly determine whether the CPSC standard or the
marketing of safety helmets has had an effect on bicycle safety, the
number of injuries and fatalities over time must be examined while
controlling for any changes in bicycle use and other factors that might
influence injuries or fatalities. If the bicycle is to be considered a mode
of transportation, then injuries per bicycle miles or bicycle trips should
be examined. If bicycle use is considered recreational, then injuries per
hour of bicycle use would be appropriate. Unfortunately, such
information is not available for the general population of the U.S. on an
annual basis. 76
Because information on the intensity of bicycle use is not available,
Viscusi examined injuries per bicycle in use as a "second-best" measure
of injuries controlled for use. He assumed a seven year operating life for
bicycles. 7 7 The National Safety Council assumes a ten year life.78
76 A 1976 survey in the Federal Republic of Germany found 15.3 accidents per
million bicycle trips, 6.6 accidents per million bicycle kilometers and 62.0 accidents
per million hours travelled by bicycle. The comparable figures for automobiles were
11.6, 0.7 and 29.4, respectively. Brog & Kuffner, Relationship of Accident
Frequency to Travel Exposure, in TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD No. 808 at
55 (1981). A recent Australian study calculated that regular bicycle users (ride at least
once per week) in that country had 2.7-5.4 fatalities per 100 million kilometers, 2-4
hospitalizations per million kilometers, 55-110 fatalities per 100 million hours and
40-80 hospitalizations per million hours. The corresponding calculations for
automobiles are 2, 0.8, 80, and 30, respectively. Mathieson, Gaps in Current
Knowledge, in BiKESAE 86 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 55, 58 (Dept. Trans. ed.
1987).
77 W. VISCUSI, supra note 9, at 84-5 and Viscusi, supra note 9, at 552. Viscusi's
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Senior Economist Gregory Rodgers of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission criticizes both simple formulations and calculates the
number of bicycles in use by using the CPSC Product Life Model.7 9
The use of bicycles as a control for bicycle use, regardless of whether a
seven or ten year life is assumed, fails to account for whether or not
bicycle owners are consistent bicycle users. 8 0 If a significant
proportion of people buy bicycles, use them for a while and then store
them away without further use, even a seven year operating life may be
inaccurate. The analysis presented here hopes to provide a more accurate
measure of bicycle use by estimating the number of active bicyclists for
each year. These estimates are based on consumer surveys and industry
estimates.8 1
A number of variables are postulated as likely to have an effect on
bicycling related injuries or fatalities. Since bicycling is popular among
young people and they are less likely to wear helmets than adults, some
control for the proportion of youth in the population is needed. Two
such measures were used: the proportion of population below the ages
of thirteen and twenty-four. In each case tested, the proportion of
analysis contained an admitted critical limitation. He only examined data through
1981 but recognized that bicycles have an average operating life of at least seven
years. His analysis therefore did not encompass a sufficiently long period of time to
show whether the rule had any effect on the number of reported injuries. As expected,
he failed to find any trend that might indicate the CPSC standard reduced the number
of bicycle-related injuries reported to NEISS.
78 See NATiONAL SAFETY CouNcL, supra note 27, at 63.
79 Rodgers, Reducing Bicycle Accidents: A Reevaluation of the Impacts of the
CPSC Bicycle Standard and Helmet Use, 11 J. PROD. LIAB. 307, 311-2 (1988).
80 Rodgers adopts users per bicycle in use as his control for intensity of use. Id. at
311. He does not explain why such a measure in appropriate.
81 The number of bicyclists were estimated by the author based on surveys
performed by the Sporting Goods Dealer magazine, the National Sporting Goods
Association, the A.C. Nielsen Company, the Department of Interior and the Gallup
Company, as well as estimates by the Bicycle Federation. For much of this data in
tabular form, see Petty, The Consumer Product Safety Commission's
Promulgation of a Bicycle Safety Standard, 10 J. PROD. LIAB. 25, 42 (1987).
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population under the age of twenty-four proved to be a slightly better
predictor. The proportion of the population with health insurance
coverage also was used to see if bicyclists are more likely to ride
recklessly if they have insurance.
Other studies have looked at consumption or income based on the
hypothesis that consumers with more income will purchase more safe
goods. However, with bicycles it is not clear that more expensive
bicycles are necessarily safer. In fact, expensive, lightweight bicycles
may be more apt to fail than their less expensive counterparts.
Therefore, no income or consumption measure was used in this study.
This study also does not control for product liability lawsuits. Although
the number of such lawsuits is generally believed to have increased
dramatically in recent years, the bicycle industry has faced relatively few
product liability lawsuits. 82
The principal independent variables of this study are whether the
CPSC standard is in effect and the proportion of bicyclists who own
(and presumably use) helmets. Because there is some disagreement
concerning the operating life of a bicycle, the proportion of bicycles in
use which satisfy the CPSC standard was calculated using the CPSC
model and a simple model, assuming alternately seven and ten year
lives. As noted previously, the author estimated the number of helmets
in use based on industry figures to obtain helmets per bicyclist.
Rodgers' study suggests two other variables. First, he uses a dummy
variable to control for a change of the NEISS sample in 1979. Although
he suggests that the change should not have much effect, the variable is
significant in some of his results. 83 It therefore is also adopted here.
The second additional variable used by Rodgers is pedestrian
fatalities. He argues that if drivers are more careful, perhaps due to
82 See infra notes 114-6 and accompanying text.
83 Rodgers, supra note 79, at 311-4.
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tougher law enforcement or reduced drunk driving, both pedestrian and
bicycle fatalities should be reduced. This variable was found to be
significant for fatalities, so it too was used here. 84 However, it is
important to realize that such a variable would also encompass any other
trends that would affect pedestrian fatalities such as the age composition
of the population, the proportion with health insurance, etc.
The causal hypotheses to be tested are straightforward. The CPSC
safety standard may cause a reduction in bicycling related injuries.
Helmet use may cause a reduction in fatalities or head injuries. There is
no reason to believe that the CPSC standard will reduce fatalities directly
except through a reduction of total injuries. In addition, there is no
reason to expect that helmet use will significantly affect the number of
overall injuries, except to reduce the number of head injuries.
A simple linear model is tested here since there is no reason to
assume a more complex relationship between the variables. Although
Viscusi recommends using the lagged dependent variable as the first
independent variable to control for the stock of pre-existing consumer
products and avoid possible serial correlation effects, lagged variables
were not used here.85 Lagged variables were not needed here because
the CPSC dummy variable controls for the stock of bicycles in use and
intensity of use was controlled using participation rather than products
currently owned. Thus, the equations to be estimated are:86
84 Id. Rodgers also uses a linear trend variable to "capture all omitted factors that
affect the risk of injury smoothly over time." Id. at 312. Since this variable was
significant for fatalities and head injuries, it was tried here, but never achieved
significance. It is difficult to imagine any such factors that would not be included in
the pedestrian variable.
85 Viscusi, supra note 9, at 532. To insure the accuracy of this assumption, lagged
variables were included experimentally in both equations. In each case the lagged
variables were not statistically significant and had negative coefficients.
86 a is the intercept coefficient, and bl through b4 are coefficients of the
independent variables.
IR is the injury rate per thousand bicyclists using NEISS data - NEISS data
was obtained from the CPSC on computer printouts for each calendar year. For more
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[1] IR = a + b1CPSC + b2POP + b31NS + b4NEISS
[2] FR = a + blHEL + b2POP + b31NS + b4PED
[3] PH a + blHEL + b2POP + b31NS + b4NEISS +b5PED
Estimates of these equations using least squares multiple regression
analysis are:87
[1] IR = 4.65 + 1.57CPSC + 0.80POP + 0.72INS - 0.42NEISS, 8 8
with 0.012, 0.01, 0.063, and 0.244 significance.
[2] FR = -3.34 + 0.35HEL + 0.07POP + 0.049INS + 1.15PED, 89
with 0.062, 0.512, 0.69 and 0 significance.
[3] PH = 14.17 - 1.12HEL - 0.76POP - 0.19INS - 0.34NEIss +
0.16PED,9 0 with 0.079, 0.045, 0.62, 0.139 and 0.586 significance.
information on NEISS, see supra note 25.
FR is the fatality rate per million bicyclists based on FARS data - published
annually by the NHTSA - see, e.g., supra note 35.
PH is the proportion of head injuries reported to NEISS. I am indebted to
Rodgers for catching arithmetic errors in my earlier study; see Rodgers, supra note
79, at 309. Rodgers' corrected figures are used here.
CPSC is one of four dummy variables assuming a seven or ten year bicycle life
and a simple or complex life cycle model.
Ha is the proportion of bicyclists who own helmets.
PoP is the proportion of the U.S. population below 24 years of age from the
U.S. Census;
IN is the proportion of population with health insurance coverage calculated
from census data and industry statistics. With regard to the latter, see, e.g., HEALTH
INSURANcE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, SouRCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANcE, 1988
UPDATE 3.
NEIss is a dummy variable controlling for the 1979 sample change.
PEDS is the pedestrian fatality rate per million automobiles in use based on
FARS data. Rodgers uses pedestrian fatality estimates from the National Safety
Council but bicycle fatalities from the FARS. Rodgers, supra note 79, at 312 n.9.
There are significant differences between the two; this study uses pedestrian fatalities
from FARS.
87 The numbers following the equations indicate, for respective independent
variables, individual statistical significance given by the t test. Following notes
indicate for each equation, respectively, variance in the data accounted for by the
equation, statistical significance, and autocorrelation among variables.
88 R2 = 0.62, p = 0.021, and Durbin Watson d = 0.85.
89 R2 =.0.96, p = 0.000, and Durbin Watson d = 0.92.
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The results for equation [1] fail to confirm the causal hypothesis. It
is statistically significant at the 97% level, and the CPSC variable is ilso
highly significant. 9 1 However, the positive coefficient of the CPSC
variable suggests that the CPSC safety standard is associated with
increasing rather than decreasing the injury rate.92
In equation [2], an incredibly significant relationship is found, but
the PED variable overwhelms all the other variables and almost
completely explains the bicyclist fatality rate. Thus, traffic factors that
affect pedestrian fatalities appear to affect bicyclist fatalities as well.
Helmet use is significant at the 90% level, but its coefficient is much
smaller than that of PED. The helmet use coefficient is however positive,
which is contrary to the causal hypothesis. It suggests that the fatality
rate increases as helmet use increases. Dropping the overwhelming PED
variable from the analysis reduces the amount of variance explained to
only 50%, and, although the regression equation itself is significant at
the 95% level, none of the individual variables are significant even at the
90% level. The insignificant coefficient for helmets does become
negative in the modified equation.
This result is curious for two reasons. First, the simple correlation
between fatality rate and helmet usage is -0.64, significant at the 99%
level. However, helmet usage is strongly negatively correlated with
pedestrian fatality rates, health insurance coverage and both alternative
population variables. The correlation coefficients range from -0.77 to
90 R2 = 0.72, p = 0.014, and Durbin Watson d = 1.47.
91 Of the four CPSC variables tested, the complex model with a ten year life
obtained the most significant results, supporting Rogers' argument against using a
simple model. See supra note 84 and related text.
92 If the NEISS figures are too inaccurate to be used, fatality rate could be used as
an imperfect measure of the standard's effects. A similar multiple regression was run
for fatality rate, but found population to be the only significant independent variable.
The coefficient for the CPSC standard was negative, at least showing that it is
associated with decreased fatalities, even though, this relationship is not statistically
significant.
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-0.89, all significant at the 99.9% level. Thus, increased helmet usage
may be associated with decreased fatality rates, but the effect may be
masked by other trends.
The latter explanation is supported by equation [3] which uses the
proportion of head injuries as the dependent variable. There, both
helmet use and the proportion of young people in the population are
significantly associated with the proportion of head injuries. Moreover,
the helmet use coefficient is negative, indicating that, as usage increases,
the proportion of head injuries decreases. Thus, it is the only equation to
confirm a causal hypothesis.
As indicated, earlier, most fatalities are caused by head injuries. 93
Why then does helmet usage appear to affect head injuries but not
fatalities? One explanation is that other factors besides head injuries
influence fatality rates. This is suggested by the simple correlation
between fatality rate and proportion of head injuries - a weak 0.27 that
is significant only at the 70% level. Alternatively, annual head injuries
are approximately 70 times the number of bicyclist fatalities. Perhaps
changes in the latter are too small to be accurately predicted by this data.
It should also be noted that the Durbin Watson d statistics frequently




Today, twelve years after the CPSC rule became effective, there is
little evidence that it has significantly reduced injuries associated with
93 See supra notes 39-41 and related teXt.
94 As discussed supra at note 85, the use of a lagged dependent variable as an
independent variable to correct for autocorrelation was not statistically significant,
and achieved a negative coefficient showing an inverse relationship with the
dependent variable. It also failed to improve the Durbin Watson d statistic.
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bicycles.95 In fact, the rule is significantly associated with an increase
rather than a decrease in the bicycling injury rate.96 There are a number
of possible explanations for this finding. First, the NEISS data may be
so inaccurate that this finding is invalid. Evidence, discussed above,
suggests the inaccuracy of NEISS particularly with regard to bicycle
injuries.9 7 Second, it is possible that when consumers learn of the
standard, they ride more recklessly. 98 This hypothesis appears unlikely
95 This rule has also been criticized as an attempt by domestic manufacturers to
restrict foreign competition. See, e.g., Cornell, Noll & Weingast, Safety
Regulation, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITm: THE NEXT TEN YEARS 457, 493-4
(H. Owen & C. Schultze eds. 1977), Viscusi, supra note 9, at 552, and S. Breyer,
REGULATIONAND ITS REFORM 115 (1982). For a refutation of this view, see Petty,
The Consumer Product Safety Commission's Promulgation of a Bicycle Safety
Standard, 10 J. PROD. LIAB. 25, 32-8 (1987). Actually the main goal of the
domestic industry appears to have been to preempt state standards. See CONSUMER
PRODUCT SAFETY ACT AMENDMENTS: Hearings on H.R. 5361 Before the
Subcomm. on Cons. Protect. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 24, 65 (1975) (Statements of Jay
Townley, Schwinn Bicycle Co. and John R. F. Baer, Bicycle Manufacturers
Association of America).
96 Even CPSC Economist Rodgers finds no statistically significant relationship
between the standard and the injury rate. The major difference between our analyses
appears to be his use of riders per bicycles in use as an independent variable to
control for intensity of use. Such a measure presumes that when there are more riders
relative to bicycles in use according to the CPSC Product Life Cycle Model, more
bicycling is done than when there are relatively few riders per bicycle. Rodgers,
supra note 79, at 315-6. As discussed supra at notes 76-81, the best measure of
bicycle use, other than bicycle miles travelled (which is not available in the U.S.) is
simply the number of people who consider themselves active bicyclists. For this
reason, adopting injuries or fatalities per bicyclist as the dependent variable
automatically controls for intensity of use.
97 See supra notes 24-5 - sources and accompanying text. See also, Heiden et
al., The Utility of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission Injury Data
System as a Basis for Product Hazard Assessment, 5 J. PROD. LIAB. 245-319
(1982) (1980 bicycle injury data is accurate + 27% with a 95% confidence level).
Rodgers asserts that the NEISS standard of error for bicycle injuries is + 7-11%.
Rodgers, supra note 79, at 316.
98 Compare Rodgers, supra note 79, at 315 (helmet use by bicyclists may cause
reckless behavior), Graham & Lee, Behavioral Response to Safety Regulation: The
Case of Motorcycle Helmet Wearing Legislation, 19 POL'Y. SCIENCES 253 (1986),
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because health insurance coverage that also might encourage reckless
riding had no significant effect (at the 95% level) on the injury rate or
fatality rate and also had extremely small coefficients. Moreover, unlike
automobiles where the driver is* surrounded by safety features, the
bicycle provides no protection from falls and collisions. Painful "road
rash" and more serious injuries should deter any reckless behavior
induced by the standard. Third, there may be some other factor
correlated with the rule that is the real causal explanation for the increase
in the injury rate. Last, the standard may actually do some harm.
This last explanation should not be quickly dismissed. The standard
requires that all bicycles be equipped with special reflectors in the front,
rear, sides, and pedals. These reflectors were touted as having a 50%
increase in performance over conventional reflectors, but while the
required rear reflector, for example, does have a broader range of
reflectivity, the SAE (conventional) reflector is 7-10 times more bright
when illuminated directly.99
There is little doubt that the CPSC's reflector standard is inadequate
for safe nighttime riding. The CPSC as much as admitted this fact in a
press release. The release noted that in 1975, nighttime deaths accounted
for 30% of all bicycle fatalities, but in 1982, the figure had risen to
42%. It further urged bicyclists to use front and rear lights, a leg light,
and reflective clothing in addition to the mandated reflectors to enhance
their nighttime visibility. 100 The NHTSA recently reported that the
proportion of bicyclist fatalities occurring between 6:00 P.M. and 6:00
and Peltzian, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulations, 83 J. POL. ECON.
677 (1975) with Crandell & Graham, Automobile Safety Regulation and Offsetting
Behavior: Some New Empirical Estimates, 74 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC.
328 (1984). See also Viscusi, The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child Resistant
Packaging on Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestions, 74 AM. ECON. REv. PAPERS &
PRoc. 324 (1984).
99 J. FORESTM, supra note 28, at 96.
100 3 CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY GUiDE (CCH) 46,671 (1984).
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A.M. had risen to 45.6%.101
Contrary, to the CPSC standard, the National Committee for
Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances continues to recommend laws
requiring a front headlamp and rear reflector or light. 102 Presently, all
50 states and the District of Columbia have adopted this
recommendation. 103 Furthermore, at least one court has recognized the
inadequacy of CPSC reflectors in a product liability case. It held a
retailer negligent for failing. to warn a consumer that reflectors are
inadequate for nighttime riding and that a light should be installed. 104
The court seems to be saying that if the CPSC reflectors mislead
bicyclists into thinking they can safely ride at night, retailers have a duty
to correct this misimpression.
However, if the standard were increasing nighttime riding and
injuries, it likely would not have a negative correlation (albeit not
statistically significant) with fatality rates. Moreover, when specific
types of injuries such as groin injuries are examined, the rule had no
significant effect on them either.105 Thus, if it is fair to judge the CPSC
by its own data base, the evidence appears at best inconclusive and
possibly negative.
There are at least three reasons why this result should not be
surprising. First, as noted above, the bicycle is inherently unstable so
the majority of bicycle-associated injuries are caused by operator
error. 10 6 Even simple misjudgments can cause significant falling
101 FARS, supra note 35, ch. 8 at 12.
102 j. FOREsE, supra note 28, at 368-9.
103 1986 BICYCLE USAALMANAC 28-9 (1986).
1 0 4 Capuano v. Almart Stores, Inc., 1 Prod. Liab. L. Rep. (CCII) 78 (PA
Northhampton County Court of Common Pleas # C-3849, Aug. 1982). This
holding is contrary to another court's decision prior to promulgation of the CPSC
standard. See Poppell v. Waters, 126 Ga. App. 385, 190 S.M. 2d 815 (1972) (The
absence of a headlight is obvious so there is no duty to warn).
105 Petty, supra note 95, at 43-4 and Rodgers, supra note 79, at 315-7.
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injuries.
Second, unlike many products addressed by the CPSC which
involve single hazards such as flammability or a sharp cutting edge, the
bicycle is a somewhat complex product operated in a complex
environment so that the interaction between the product, its maintenance
and design; its operator; and the environment, create numerous possible
safety issues. The CPSC simply may have been technically incompetent
to deal with all of these issues. For example, one of the provisions
remanded by the Court of Appeals was the CPSC's heat test for brake
blocks of hand brakes. The Court found the distinction between hand
and foot brakes to be irrational since only foot brakes are known to fail
from excess heat. 107 Forester documents several other examples. 10 8
Third and finally, there is little evidence that product defects cause a
significant number of bicycle-associated injuries. As Rodgers notes, the
CPSC had estimated that 17% of all bicycle-associated injuries are
related to product failure and would be addressed by the standard. 109
However, this estimate was derived from a sample of bicycle injuries
designed to over-represent product-related injuries. The CPSC
consultants who analyzed this biased sample estimated that the
proportion of product-related injuries for the population as a whole was
8%.110
10 6 See sources cited supra at notes 31-3 and BUREAU OF PRODUCT SAFETY, supra
note 49, at 5-7.
107 559 F.2d at 793.
108 J. FORESTM, supra note 28, at 363-9.
109 Rodgers, supra note 79, at 316.
110 j. FLORA ET AL., EXTENSIONOFTHE NEISS DATA ANALYSIS INCLUDING CPSC
IN-DEyIm REPORTS OF BICYCLE-AsOCiATED ACCIDENTS 21 (1977) and Flora &
Abbott, supra note 26, at 25. Interestingly, this study found that bicycles identified
as being in compliance with the BMA/6 standard (upon which the CPSC's standard
is based) had a slightly higher rate of product failure than bicycles which would not
be identified as complying with the standard. This difference was not statistically
significant. Id. at 24. See also, J. FORESTER, supra note 28, at 52, 84. (estimating
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A lower estimate of the proportion of bicycle-related injuries caused
by product failure is given by Jerrold Kaplan's 1974 study of regular
adult bicyclists. He found that only 3% of all accidents, even those not
severe enough to be reported to NEISS, for these users were caused by
product failure.111 Admittedly, the bicyclists in this sample were likely
to maintain their bicycles in better than average condition. Of this small
proportion, 3-8% of all injuries, perhaps as many as 90% of the failures
occur in bicycles at least three years old.112 Product standards covering
new products cannot prevent eventual product failures from worn
components or poorly maintained bicycles. Many bicycle components
such as brakes and gearing require periodic maintenance and the
replacement of worn parts. 113 Thus, the actual proportion of injuries
which the CPSC could have possibly effected through a product
standard is probably less than 2% - far below its 20% goal across all
products.
That only a very small proportion of bicycle accidents are caused by
product defects is confirmed by casual observation of product liability
that 6% of all bicycle-related injuries and fatalities are caused by equipment failure);
the University of Kansas Medical Center Survey, supra note 32, reported bicyclists
blaming mechanical problems as the cause of 15% of their accidents. STUTS ET AL.,
supra note 25, at 14, reports that 15.6% of bicycle related injuries treated in North
Carolina emergency rooms in 1985 and 12.5% of those in 1986 were reported caused
by mechanical failure.
111J KAPLAN, CHARACTERISTCS OF THE REGULAR ADULT BICYCLE USE. 51 (1975).
See also, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHwAYs AND TRANSPORTATION, PLANNING
AND DESIGN OF BIKEWAYS (1974) (Bicycle defects were contributing factors in less
than 3% of all bicycle-motor vehicle accidents) and a survey of children bicyclists
between April and September 1983 in the Emergency Department of the Children's
Hospital of Philadelphia found that they reported only 3% of all accidents occurred
because of equipment failure. However, the bicycle was known to be in need of repair
by the child or caretaker in 24% of the cases. Selbst et al., supra note 54, at 141.
112 FLORA, supra note 110.
113 Kenneth Cross' study of bicycle/motor vehicle accidents found that brakes had
the highest frequency of alleged contribution to bicycle/motor vehicle accidents. This
problem was reported to be a contributory factor in 6% of the accidents studied. K.
CROSS, supra note 25, at 36-7.
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suits. Paul Hill, author of BICYCLE LAW AND PRACTICE, notes:
"[t]here are relatively few reported bicycle product liability cases."'1 14
He presents 13 reported cases and a couple of others. 1 15 I have found
two additional cases. 116
By comparison, all terrain vehicles, which are associated with only
240 deaths annually and 86,400 other injuries in 1986 over only 6.7
million users, are the subject of over 300 product liability law suits
reportedly currently pending against the industry leader. A coalition of
110 plaintiffs' lawyers has formed the ATV Litigation Group to share
information. 117 This coalition and the number of pending suits despite
the comparatively small number of injuries indicates the products
liability bar's belief that all terrain vehicles may be defectively
designed. 1 18 Apparently the bar has no such belief about the ATVs'
older cousin, the two wheeled, non-motorized bicycle.
114 P. HIL, supra note 34, at 27.
115 Id. at 27-36. Hill summarizes the following cases: Poppell v. Waters, 190
S.E.2d 815 (Ga. App. 1972), Means v. Sears, Roebuck, 550 S.W. 2d 780 (Mo.
1977), Reis v. M1D Products, 456 A. 2d 211 (Pa. Super. 1983), Walden v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co., 654 F. 2d 443 (5th Cir. 1981), Caporale v. Raleigh Industries,
382 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1980), Washington v. Otasco, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1295 (N.D.
Miss. 1985), Outwater v. Miller, 158 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1957), Khoder v. AMF, Inc.,
539 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1976), Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 217 A.2d 71 (Conn.
1965), Levin v. Cleveland Welding Co. 87 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1963), Wilson v.
Naifeh, 539 P.2d 390 (Okla. 1975), Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 406 F.2d
859 (4th Cir. 1969), and Parisi v. Carl W. Bush Co., 67 A.2d 875 (NJ. 1949).
116 Capuano v. Almart Stores, Inc., 1 Prod. Liab. L. Rep. (CCH) 78 (Aug. 1982)
and Harris v. Giant Man. Co., 4 Prod. Liab. L. Rep. (CCH) 8 (Jan. 1985).
117 Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1987, at 29, and Legal Times of Washington, Jan. 22,
1987, at 1, 8-10. See also Rodgers, The Effectiveness of Helmets in Reducing
All-Terrain Vehicle Injuries and Deaths, 22 ACCIDENT ANAL & PREy. 47 (1990)
(1,100 ATV fatalities and 400,000 emergency room-treated injuries since 1982).
118 The CPSC and the Department of Justice recently announced a preliminary
settlement of a lawsuit to recall all three wheeled ATVs. The settlement called for a
ban of all future sales of three wheeled ATVs but has been criticized as too lenient.
Nat'l L. J., May 2, 1988, at 8.
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Helmet Usage
In contrast to the bleak safety results of the CPSC standard, there is
some evidence, albeit contradictory, that the market development of
safety helmets has had a positive impact on safety.11 9 The multiple
regression results presented here indicate a significant positive or an
insignificant relationship between helmet usage and fatality rates. This
suggestion that helmet use may be increasing fatalities appears
contradicted by the significant negative relationship between helmet
usage and the proportion of injuries that are head injuries. Since there
are many times the number of head injuries than fatalities, head injuries
are more likely to show an effect from the small amount of helmet use.
It would therefore seem that the head injury finding is more credible
than the fatality rate evidence. Indeed, medical studies suggest that head
injuries are the primary cause of bicycling fatalities. 120 In addition, a
significant simple correlation of -0.64 was found between helmet usage
and fatality rates, suggesting that with better data a stronger relationship
might be found.
Perhaps even more compelling than the statistical evidence presented
here, are medical studies that independently establish the beneficial
safety effects of helmet usage. A recent controlled study by Thompson
et al. compared 235 patients with head injuries received while bicycling
to 433 other patients with non-head bicycling injuries and 558
population controls who were demographically matched to the head
injury group. Unconditional logistic-regression techniques were used to
calculate that riders who used helmets had an 85% reduction in their risk
of receiving head injury.12 1
119But see Rodgers, supra note 79, at 315-6 (helmet use positively related to
fatality rate, but not significantly related to head injury rate).12 0 See supra notes 39-40 - sources and related text.
121 Thompson, Rivara, & Thompson, A Case-Control Study of the Effectiveness
of Bicycle Safety Helmets, 320 N. ENG. J. MED. 1361 (1989).
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An Australian study also suggests that helmets are effective in
reducing head injuries related to bicycle use. Dorsch et al. surveyed club
members to find 197 bicyclists who received a blow to the head or
helmet in their most recent crash. They found a statistically significant
difference in the severity of injury between helmeted riders and
unhelmeted riders. They suggest that 90% of deaths due to head injury
could be prevented by the use of hardshell helmets. 122
Conclusion and Recommendations
Political scientist, Aaron Wildavsky, has written: "Because
regulation is anticipatory, regulators frequently guess wrong about
which things are dangerous; therefore, they compensate by blanket
prohibitions. ' 123 He neglects to mention that regulators often analyze
risk in terms of their authority and preferences for dealing with it.124
Thus, the CPSC did not carefully analyze all the risks of bicycling, but
rather focused on product-related risks. It attempted to compensate for
its narrow focus by regulating every conceivable product-related hazard,
regardless of likely significance. The result is a safety standard that at
best has no positive measurable effect on safety and may itself constitute
a hazard. 125
122 Dorsch et al., Do Bicycle Safety Helmets Reduce Severity of Head Injury in
Real Crashes?, 19 AccIDENT ANAL & PREVENTION 183 (1987).
123 A. WILDAvSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY 183 (1988).
1 2 4 Thomas, Revealed Bureaucratic Preference: Priorities of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, 19 RAND J. ECON. 102, 112 (1988) (CPSC favored mandatory
standards over other types of projects and weighed safety benefits more heavily than
consumer costs).
1 2 5 For similar research showing negative safety effects for bicyclists from changes
in roadway design and other engineering "improvements", see Johnson et al., The
Wheels of Misfortune: A Time Series Analysis of Bicycle Accidents on a College
Campus, 2 EVALUATION Q. 608, 617 (1978) ("... engineering and impounding
interventions intended to create a safer biking environment have had no significant
impact on the number of bicycle accidents. They may also have made things
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Congress deserves much of the blame for the CPSC's myopia. It
could have created a broad-based safety agency rather than one focused
on promulgating safety standards (and ordering recalls) as the only
means of regulating product-related risks. Congress recently has
modified CPSC authority to require it to use a more informational
approach and rely on industry standards where they are effective. 126
Consistent with this new approach, the CPSC and other government
agencies could play a significant role in improving bicycle safety in four
ways. First, merely providing information can help. The CPSC and
NHTSA both collect data on injuries and fatalities that enable others to
study specific problems and judge whether progress is being made. 127
The NHTSA funded a study of bicycle-motor vehicle accidents that was
published in 1977. It recommends specific strategies for reducing
injuries and is still the best U.S. study available today on that topic. 128
Second, the government in publicizing safety problems often allows
the market to work toward improving safety. 12 9 The CPSC could have
conducted informational studies designed to expose various problems,
worse.").
126 The Consumer Product Safety Act's authorization to set mandatory standards was
amended in 1981 to require the CPSC to rely on voluntary standards "whenever
compliance with such voluntary standards would eliminate or adequately reduce the
risk of injury addressed and it is likely that there will be substantial compliance with
such voluntary standards." 15 U.S.C. § 2056(b). See generally, Klayman, Standard
Setting Under the Consumer Product Safety Amendments of 1981 - A Shift in
Regulatory Philosophy, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 96 (1982). Had this section been
operative when the CPSC considered bicycles, it may have simply chosen to rely on
the industry standard.
127 See e.g., Viscusi, supra note 6, at 76 ("Government regulation is the most
effective institution for generating new risk information.").
128 K. CROSS & G. FISHER, IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND
CouNTERMAsuRE APPROACHES TO ENHANCE BICYCLE SAFETY (1977). For other
examples of useful government efforts in this area, see sources, supra note 2.
129 See Viscusi, Market Incentives for Safety, 78 HARv. Bus. R. 133 (1985)
(arguing that government regulators underestimate the market incentive of the profit
motive for producing safe products).
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and done more to encourage safe riding and safety equipment usage. 130
As noted above, the FINAL REPORT of the Commission of Product
Safety condemned high rise bicycles, led the industry to eliminate many
of the criticized hazards and to develop its voluntary standard that served
as the basis for the CPSC standard. 131 Similarly, in the mid-1970's, the
CPSC spent $21,000 for a study of childrens' tricycles. The study
found room for numerous safety improvements including lowering the
tricycles' center of gravity, widening the rear wheels and limiting the
turning radius. The CPSC refused to take any action such as proposing
a safety standard based on the study.132 Soon after the report was
produced, a second generation of tricycles appeared, often constructed
of plastic, which incorporate many of these design proposals. The
CPSC has just announced that it will study the adequacy of bicycle
helmet industry safety standards and testing procedures. 13 3 If
deficiencies are found, the industry might very well adopt any changes
recommended by the CPSC.
Third, the government can play an important role in educating
bicycle operators on how to avoid accidents and on the benefits of safety
equipment. 134 For example just educating riders not to ride into a street
without looking for other traffic first could reduce fatalities by 15% and
nonfatal motor vehicle accidents by a comparable amount. Similarly,
eliminating riding on the wrong side of the street would reduce fatalities
by 8% and nonfatal injuries by over 20%.135 As noted above, the
130 AccordRodgers, supra note 79, at 317.
131 See supra note 46 and related text.
132 Weaver, The Hazards of Trying to Make Consumer Products Safer, in
CONSUMEMSM: THE SEARCH FORTHE CONSUMER INTMERFSr 373 (D. Aaker & G. Day
eds. 1978).
133 10 Pro Bike News 2 (Jul. 1990).
134 See, e.g., Adler & Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an
Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 159 (1984) (evaluating
three education safety campaigns of varying degrees of success).
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CPSC has missed some opportunities to issue effective educational
materials. 136 Moreover, the safety standard requires that consumer
information on bicycle maintenance be provided with the bicycle, but
does not require information on the benefits of safety equipment or rules
for safe operation.
Of course, the CPSC does not have the budget to conduct an
intensive nationwide education campaign. Perhaps such campaigns are
best conducted at the local level as illustrated by helmet-usage
campaigns successfully conducted by a number of communities. 137 A
sixteen month community campaign directed at children increased
helmet use in Seattle, Washington from 5.5% to 15.7% of observed
riders. The late Bette Coan of Palo Alto, California developed three
bicycle safety programs for children and had remarkable success in
convincing children to wear helmets. She sold them more than 25,000
helmets. 138 Similarly, a promotion and coupon campaign in Missoula,
Montana targeting helmets for school children sold 249 helmets in the
first three and one-half weeks. 139 Two parents in Olympia, Washington
purchased 60 helmets for grade school children and reportedly helmet
wearing became commonplace shortly thereafter.140
While the programs described above were largely developed from
the efforts of private individuals, other programs have had the
involvement of local government. Children and adults in Victoria,
Australia increased helmet usage after an extensive promotional
135 12 Bicycle Forum 3 (Dec. 1985).
136 See supra note 55 and related text.
137The Head Smart Coalition, National Safe Kids Campaign, and other groups,
including the states of Florida and North Carolina, all planned helmet use
promotional campaigns for 1989. 22 Bicycle Forum 1, 2 (Win./Spr. 1989) and 9 Pro
Bike News 1, 2 (Mar. 1989).
138 15 Bicycle Forum 20 (Spr. 1987).
139 Id. at 23.
140 Wilson, supra note 71, at 20.
2 RISK -Issues inHealth & Safety 93 [Spring 1991]
program. Primary school children increased usage rates from 4.6% in
1983 to 36.6% in 1985; secondary school children increased rates from
1.6% in 1983 to 14% in 1985 and adults increased their usage rates
from 26.1% in 1983 to 42% in 1985.141
Last, a coalition of local government and various local organizations
in Madison, Wisconsin conducted a one month helmet usage campaign.
About half of all bicyclists there became aware of the message. Of the
50,000 bicyclists who were exposed to the campaign, about 5,000 were
prompted to wear helmets, increasing observed usage rates from 15% to
19.2%.142 The CPSC missed an opportunity to encourage helmet use
and light usage at night by not requiring conspicuous notices of the
value of such devices somewhere in its standard.143
Finally, the government, but not the CPSC, in its role as
adjudicator, also helps reduce product-related injuries through the trial
of liability lawsuits. 144 Because the number of reported bicycle lawsuits
appears relatively small, they have been mentioned here only in
passing. 14 5 However, even without rigorous analysis of the safety
141 Elliott, Encouraging Helmet Wearing, in BIKESAFE, supra note 76, at 355,
365, reprinted and condensed in, 23 Bicycle Forum 4-9 (Spr./Sum. 1989).
142 S. BERCHEM, A CoMMuNrrY CAMPAIGN THAT INCREASED HELMET USE AMONG
BICYCLSTs: SUMMARY REPORT 19-20 (Traffic Engineering Division, Department of
Transportation, City of Madision, WI, 1986).
143 At least one pair of commentators noticed this opportunity early in the CPSC's
existence: "The fact that at least 80% of the consumer product-related injuries may
not be caused by defective or unsafe products suggests that consumer education has a
large untapped potential for reducing such injuries." Miller & Parausarman,
Advising Consumers on Safer Product Use: The Information Role of the New
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 36 AM. MKTG. A. PRoc. 372, 373 (1974).
144 See e.g., Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing The
Appropriate Institutional Division of Labor, 78 AM. ECON. REv. 300, 303 (1988)
(Proposing that firms be exempted from product liability suits if they can
demonstrate either compliance with a government regulation that leads to an efficient
degree of safety or the use of a hazard warnings program that leads the market to
promote an efficient level of risk.).
145 See supra, notes 114-8.
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effects of product liability suits, it is appropriate to mention briefly their
interaction with regulatory and market efforts to improve safety. While
some champion the common law as efficient, 14 6 others condemn
products liability law as too overreaching. 14 7 This study suggests that
bicycle product liability suits are efficient.
First, the threat of such suits (and potentially large liability awards)
encourages manufacturers to reduce safety risks inherent in product
designs, to warn of those that cannot be addressed through design
changes, and to instruct users of other ways to avoid them if possible.
Thus, such suits may substitute for or complement safety standards.
Second, recent amendments to the CPSA require firms that lose or
settle three or more suits involving a particular product model to report
this to the CPSC. While the information is kept confidential, it assists in
setting priorities and conducting investigations. 14 8 Had this been done
earlier, ihe low number of bicycle product liability lawsuits should have
suggested to the CPSC that there was little need for safety standards. 14 9
Last, such suits may require consumers to take measures to
ameliorate their own injuries. A recent North Dakota Supreme Court
case ordered a new trial to include evidence on how the plaintiff s failure
to use a motorcycle helmet may have forseeably increased his injuries.
On remand, it could well be the case that the plaintiff may recover only
for those injuries that would have been suffered had he in fact been
146 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
235 (1979); Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common
Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); and Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
147 See e.g., P. HUBER, LIABILITY (1988).
148 Nat'l L. J., Nov. 2, 1990, at 25.
149 Liability suits do not directly prevent injuries, only compensate for them if fault
is proved. In cases, like toxic substances, where fault is difficult to establish,
liability suits may not be an efficient indicator of the correctability through standards
of a safety problem. See, e.g., S. SHAvELL, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
277-285 (1987), and Adler, supra note 21, at 79-80.
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wearing a helmet. 150 While this decision appears to be in the minority
and has not been applied to bicyclists yet, it may nonetheless represent a
trend that may have a favorable impact of bicycle safety in the future. 15 1
This aspect of private litigation furthers market efforts to improve safety
by encouraging the purchase (and use) of helmets.
The CPSC may be able to avoid burdensome regulations if its
efforts complement civil litigation. For example, it can test alternative
warnings and instructions for effectiveness and propose the best for
use. Such studies are likely to be very useful in determining liability in
particular lawsuits.
Although this paper has focused on bicycles, it offers suggestions
for improving safety generally. It supports arguments that a poorly
conceived safety standard may be ineffective or, worse, do more harm
than good - while appearing to address the problem. As Visbusi
suggests, 152 government efforts to assist market forces are likely to be
more useful. The capacity of the government to conduct studies and
publicize the results appears to be underutilized and offers a cost
effective way to reduce risks of product injury.
15 0 Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W. 2d 118 (1983). See also Graham, Helmetless
Motorcyclists - Easy Riders Facing Hard Facts: The Rise of the "Motorcycle
Helmet Defense, 41 OHIO ST. L. J. 233 (1980).
151 The wearing of helmets is analogous to using seatbelts. According to one recent
article, the seatbelt defense in crashworthiness cases is recognized in 14 states,
unsettled in 14 states, and rejected by the highest court in 14 states and by the
legislature in 8 states. Westenberg, Buckle Up or Pay: The Emerging Safety Belt
Defense, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 867, 886-9, 923-33 (1986).
152 Supra note 129.
